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COMMENTS
in another federal court. Even if such an injunction were issued
by another federal court, it would appear that the federal court
in which the litigation was pending would transfer the case
rather than honor the injunction by sustaining it as a special
plea in bar. If the court felt that it had sufficient reasons to
refuse to transfer the case, surely the same reasons would be
sufficient for the court to disregard the injunction. Likewise, it
would seem that if a state court issued an injunction directed at
parties to a suit in a federal court, the federal court would trans-
fer the case to the federal district court for the district in which
the state court granting the injunction is located or to some other,
more convenient, federal court. Further, if the federal court
felt there were sufficient reasons to refuse transfer of the case,
then the same reasons should be sufficient for the federal court
to disregard the injunction.
JACK J. ROGERS*
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN PERSONAM:
RECIPROCITY
P procures a personal judgment in a foreign country against
A and then attempts to enforce it in B, a member state of the
United States of America. Is this judgment, when P seeks to
enforce it in State B, prima facie evidence only and hence ex-
aminable upon the merits or is it conclusive in its res judicata
effects and in an action for its enforcement? What difference
does it make whether or not the courts of foreign country A
regard the judgments of State B as conclusive proof of the
merits? Will the result be the same if the suit is brought in a
state court or in a federal court? The scope of this comment is
to resolve, if possible, these questions regarding the enforcement
of judgments of foreign countries.
At early common law, both in England' and in this country,2
the large majority of cases in which foreign judgments were
* Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, Lake Charles Bar.
1. Phillips v. Hunter, 2 H. B1. 402, 126 Eng. Reprint 618 (1795) ; Hall v.
Odber, 11 East. 118, 103 Eng. Reprint 949 (1809); Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug.
1, 99 Eng. Reprint 1 (1813); Arnott v. Redfern, 3 Bing. 353, 130 Eng. Reprint
549 (1826); Houlditch v. Donegal, 8 Bligh N.S. 301, 5 Eng. Reprint 955 (1834).
2 Black, The Law of Judgments (2 ed. 1902) 1234, § 825.
2. Burnham v. Webster, 1 Wood. & M. (U.S.) 172, Fed. Cas. No. 2,179
(C. C. D. Maine 1846); Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 2 Am. Dec. 36 (1805).
See Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, 10 Am. Dec. 151 (1822); Bissell v. Briggs,
9 Mass. 462, 6 Am. Dec. 88 (1812); Benton v. Burgot, 10 Serg. & R. 240 (Pa.
1823); Boston India Rubber Factory v. Hoit, 14 Vt. 92 (1842); Story, Conflict
of Laws (5 ed. 1857) 973, § 608.
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sought to be enforced held them to be prima facie evidence only.
The later English cases manifested a definite change, however,
and from the time of Godard v. Gray3 (1870) to the present, there
has been no doubt that in England a foreign judgment is, in the
absence of fraud, lack of jurisdiction, et cetera, as conclusive upon
the parties as if it were a domestic judgment.4 These later
English decisions exerted persuasive influence upon the American
courts, and shortly after the turn of the Nineteenth Century the
various jurisdictions that had considered the problem, with one
possible exception,) had given, conclusive effect to foreign judg-
ments and had rejected their earlier position that foreign judg-
ments, simply because they were foreign judgments, should be
re-examinable upon the merits.6
In 1895, in the case of Hilton v. Guyot,7 the Supreme Court
of the United States interjected a new element into the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments. Here the plaintiff, a French firm, had
recovered a money judgment in the Tribunal of Commerce of
Paris against an American partnership owning property in
France. Plaintiff sought to enforce the judgment in the Circuit
Court of the United States in New York. Notwithstanding a re-
quest by the defendants, the circuit court refused to review the
French judgment on the merits. Defendants appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Gray, in the face of a
strong dissent by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, recognized the general
rule to be that such a foreign judgment is conclusive as to the
merits, but laid down the collateral and qualifying rule that, on
principles of "comity," judgments rendered in France, by whose
law judgments of the United States are reviewable on their
merits, are not conclusive when sued upon in the United States
and are only prima facie evidence of the plaintiff's claim. The
decree of the circuit court was reversed and the cause remanded
with directions to try the case upon the merits.
In the case of Ritchie v. McMullen,8 decided the same day
3. L.R. 6 Q.B. 139.
4. Guiard v. DeClermont [1914) 3 K.B. 145. See Roussillon v. Rousillon
[1880] 14 Ch. D. 351, 370; Harris v. Taylor [1915] 2 K.B. 580, 591. See also
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3 ed. 1949) 605, § 208.
5. Tourigny v. Houle, 88 Me. 406, 34 AtM. 158 (1896); Tremblay v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 97 Me. 547, 55 Atl. 509, 94 Am. St. Rep. 521 (1903).
6. Hilton v. Guyot, 42 Fed. 249 (C.C. N.Y. 1890); Jones v. Jamison, 15 La.
Ann. 35 (1860); Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91 (1895); Baker v. Palmer, 83
Ill. 568 (1876); McEwan v. Zimmer, 38 Mich. 765, 31 Am. Rep. 332 (1878);
Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 82 Am. Dec. 404 (1862); Konitzky v. Meyer,
49 N.Y. 571 (1872); Dunstan v. Higgens, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729, 20 L.R.A.
668, 34 Am. St. Rep. 431 (1893).
7. 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95.
8. 159 U.S. 235, 16 S.Ct. 171, 40 L.Ed. 133 (1895).
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as Hilton v. Guyot, the facts were substantially the same. Plain-
tiffs recovered a money judgment against the defendant in the
High Court of Justice for Ontario. Plaintiffs then sought to en-
force this judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for
Ohio. The circuit court refused to re-examine the merits of the
claim. The Supreme Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Gray, speaking
for the court, pointed out that the "judgment of the Canadian
court, is beyond all doubt, sufficient to support this action, unless
it is sufficiently impeached. Testing the answer in this case by
the rules laid down in Hilton v. Guyot, just decided, no adequate
ground for impeaching the judgment is shown .... 9 By the law
of England, prevailing in Canada, a judgment rendered by an
American court under like circumstances would be allowed full
and conclusive effect."10
This doctrine of reciprocity became, of course, binding upon
the lower federal courts. If the judgment sought to be enforced
in the federal court was rendered by the court of a country allow-
ing American judgments to be re-examined au fond, and the
defendant successfully established this fact, the court would like-
wise allow a re-examination upon the merits. If, however, the
judgment was rendered by the court of a country giving conclu-
sive effect to American judgments or having a similar doctrine
of reciprocity, the judgment was deemed conclusive upon the
merits. Thus, in Gioe v. Westervelt," the court reluctantly denied
a motion to dismiss suit upon an Italian judgment. The judgment
was "fearfully and wonderfully made, and, so far as one can
make out from the documents, rankly unjust. 1 2 The court, citing
Hilton v. Guyot, felt there was "nothing to do save to accept it
as a finality,' 3 it appearing that "under Italian law similar judg-
ments of the courts of this country are not reviewable upon the
merits when sued on in Italy, but are given full credit and con-
clusive effedt.1' 4 Likewise in Strauss v. Conried, 15 plaintiff
sought an injunction to protect rights acquired under an Austrian
judgment. In granting the injunction the court refused to ex-
amine into the merits of the decree, having found that in "Austria
the rule of reciprocity ... has long been established by imperial
decrees and judicial decisions. ' "1
9. 159 U.S. 235, 240, 16 S.Ct. 171, 173, 40 L.Ed. 133, 135.
10. 159 U.S. 235, 242, 16 S.Ct. 171, 174, 40 L.Ed. 133, 136.
11. 116 Fed. 1017 (C.C. N.Y. 1902).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 1018.
15. 121 Fed. 199 (C.C. N.Y. 1902).
16. Id. at 200.
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In Kessler v. Armstrong Cork Company7 an action was
brought against a New York firm of bankers. Defendants set
up a prior French adjudication. No offer was made to prove the
French law on the subject of foreign judgments. Relying solely
upon Hilton v. Guyot, the trial court held that the French judg-
ment was not conclusive. The circuit court of appeals criticised
the trial court, pointing out that mere reliance on the Hilton case
was not sufficient and that "foreign law must be proved in every
case as a fact,""' but held that the French judgment was not res
judicata because there was no privity between the parties at bar
and the parties to the French suit.
In Cruz v. O'Boyle9 plaintiff sought enforcement of a Mexi-
can judgment in a federal court in Pennsylvania. The court
quoted from the Hilton case that "'In Mexico the system of reci-
procity has been adopted, by the Code of 1884,' "20 and refused to
allow a retrial into the merits of the cause. The same effect was
reached in Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines.21 Here an action was
brought to enjoin enforcement of an Ontario money judgment.
The court held that the Canadian decree on the issue of fraud
was res judicata and refused the injunction, saying, "The prin-
ciple of comity is extended by the courts of this country to the
judgments of the courts of a foreign country to the same extent
that courts in a foreign country extend the principle to judgments
of the courts in this country," 22 and, "by the law of England, pre-
vailing in Canada, a judgment rendered by 'an American court
cannot be collaterally attacked except under practically the same
conditions as prevail under the 'full faith and credit' clause of the
Federal Constitution. ' 23 Similarly, in Vogel v. New York Life
Insurance Company,24 the question arose as to the validity of a
German decree of administration, under which title to insurance
proceeds was alleged to have been transferred. The court pointed
out that according to the record the making and filing of the will
along with its opening in court resembled a probate in common
form, and the administration founded thereon "is entitled to faith
and credit here; Germany extending such faith and credit to our
like proceedings." 2
17. 158 Fed. 744 (C.C.A. 2d, 1907).
18. Id. at 748.
19. 197 Fed. 824 (D.C. Pa. 1912).
20. Id. at 829.
21. 33 F. (2d) 667 (C.C.A. 1st, 1929).
22. Id. at 671.
23. Ibid.
24. 55 F. (2d) 205 (C.C.A. 5th, 1932).
25. Id. at 209.
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In Compania Mexicana Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 6
the defendant, the unsuccessful plaintiff in a prior suit brought
in Mexico against the present plaintiff, alleged that he could not
be held for costs imposed upon losing litigants under a Mexican
statute. The federal court, sitting in Texas, pointed out that the
imposition of costs upon an unsuccessful litigant is entirely con-
sistent with the Texas policy; that "In Mexico the system of re-
ciprocity has been adopted by the code of 1884,' '27 and hence,
"There is no reason why the rule that a judgment valid by the
laws and practice of the country where rendered, should not
apply here. ' '28
One significant limitation on the doctrine of reciprocity was
pointed out in Direction Der Disconto-Geseilschaft v. United
States Steel Corporation.2 9 In that case the question arose as to
whether the United States should recognize a title derived in an
English seizure under the Trading with the Enemy Act when
England might not recognize a title derived from a similar seizure
by the United States. The plaintiffs argued that the United States
should not extend recognition until it was proved that the United
Kingdom would extend like recognition. Judge Learned Hand
said, "Whatever may be thought of that decision [Hilton v.
Guyot], the court certainly did not mean to hold that an Ameri-
can court was to recognize no obligations or duties arising else-
where until it appeared that the sovereign of the locus recipro-
cally recognized similar obligations existing here. That doctrine
I am happy to say is not a part of American jurisprudence." 80
The doctrine of reciprocity enunciated in Hilton v. Guyot has
not gone unchallenged. As Professor Stumberg points out, "The
reciprocity doctrine is based upon an idea of retaliation, which
as between nations should fall within the province of the depart-
ment of foreign affairs."3' 1 The same thought was put forth by
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the dissent in the Hilton
case. He said, "The application of the doctrine of res judicata
does not rest in discretion; and it is for the government, and not
for the courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion, if it be deemed
under the circumstances desirable or necessary. '32 Black, in his
Treatise on the Law of Judgments, writes, "A judgment, whether
26. 41 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. Tex. 1941).
27. Id. at 909.
28. Ibid.
29. 300 Fed. 741 (D.C. N.Y. 1924).
30. Id. at 747.
31. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1 ed. 1937) 126.
32. 159 U.S. 113, 234, 16 S.Ct. 139, 171, 40 L.Ed. 95, 133 (1895).
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foreign or domestic, raises a binding obligation to pay the sum
awarded by it. . . ." and further that, "It is not the policy of the
law to encourage litigation. '3 3 Justice Story, in his Commentaries
on Conflict of Laws, calls attention to numerous difficulties in-
herent in a retrial of the merits. "Some of the witnesses may be
since dead; some of the vouchers may be lost, or destroyed. The
merits of the cause, as formerly before the court upon the whole
evidence, may have been decidedly in favor of the judgment;
upon a partial possession of the original evidence they may now
appear otherwise . . . is the defendant to be at liberty to retry
the whole merits, and to make out, if he can, a new case upon
new evidence? Or is the court to review the former decision, like
a court of appeal, upon the old evidence? . . . are all circum-
stances to be reexamined anew? If they are, by what laws and
rules of evidence and principles of justice is the validity of the
original judgment to be tried? Is the court to open the judgment,
and to proceed ex aequo et bono? Or is it to administer strict
law, and stand to the doctrines of the local administration of jus-
tice? Is it to act upon the rules of evidence acknowledged in its
own jurisprudence, or upon those of the foreign jurisprudence? '3 4
Perhaps the most notable case refusing to extend recognition
of the reciprocity doctrine is Johnston v. Compagnie Gdndrale
Transiatlantique5 Here a New York resident sued a French com-
pany in a New York court for misdelivery of goods. Defendant
set up, as a defense, a judgment rendered by the Tribunal of
Commerce of Paris upon the same cause of action by and against
the plaintiff. Judge Pound, in speaking for the New York Court
of Appeals and holding the French judgment to be conclusive
upon the merits, pointed out, "The New York rule was stated in
Dunstan v. Higgens (138 N.Y. 70), decided in 1893, as follows:
'It is the settled law of this State that a foreign judgment is con-
clusive upon the merits' ,,;36 that the enforcement of foreign
judgments should rest, "not on the basis of reciprocity, but rather
upon the persuasiveness of the foreign judgment,"3 7 and further
"that this court is not bound to follow the Hilton case. .. .
The very next year in Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp and
Paper Company39 the doctrine was again urged. Here a money
33. 2 Black, The Law of Judgments (2 ed. 1902) 1242, § 829.
34. Story, Conflict of Laws (5 ed. 1857) 971, § 607.
35. 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121, 46 A.L.R. 435 (1926).
36. 242 N.Y. 381, 384, 152 N.E. 121, 122, 46 A.L.R. 435, 437.
37. 242 N.Y. 381, 387, 152 N.E. 121, 123, 46 A.L.R. 435, 439.
38. 242 N.Y. 381, 387, 152 N.E. 121, 123, 46 A.L.R. 435, 439.
39. 219 N.Y. Supp. 284, 219 App. Div. 120 (1927).
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judgment rendered in Quebec was sued upon. Quebec does not
give conclusive effect to judgments rendered in other countries
and the defendant, urging lack of reciprocity in the Province of
Quebec, rested "its contentions confidently on the decision in
Hilton v. Guyot. °4 0 Judge Van Kirk, speaking for the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, pointed out that the "force
and effect to be given to a foreign judgment is for each sovereign
power to determine for itself. . . .The Court of Appeals in its
latest utterance has not accepted the decision in the Hilton case
as controlling authority in this state upon the question .... The
rule controlling in this state is held to be the rule as stated in
Dunstan v. Higgens. ''41 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion.42
The Johnston and Cowans cases have remained the law in
New York. In Coudenhove-Kalergi v. Dieterle,43 wherein the
plaintiff sought recovery upon a judgment rendered in the Re-
public of Germany, the Supreme Court of New York, in allow-
ing the plaintiff's claim, quotes from the Johnston case: "It [a
right acquired under a foreign judgment] therefore rests, not on
the basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the persuasiveness of
the foreign judgment."44 Likewise the New York court in In re
Rutherfurd's Estate45 refused to allow the plaintiff to relitigate
a claim, it appearing that the plaintiff had previously been de-
feated on the same cause of action when suing before a French
tribunal. On the basis of the Johnston case the French judgment
was held to be conclusive.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has also repudiated the recip-
rocity doctrine. In Coulborn v. Joseph46 the plaintiff was seeking
enforcement of an English alimony decree rendered while both
plaintiff and defendant were domiciled in England. After discuss-
ing Hilton v. Guyot, the court concluded that the facts "would
probably justify us in placing on the ground of comity the ruling
that the English judgment is conclusive . . .but we prefer to
place it on what we consider the more convenient and the safest
rule, and the one more consistent with sound principles, '47 that
40. 219 N.Y. Supp. 284, 286.
41. 219 N.Y. Supp. 284, 287.
42. Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp and Paper Co., 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E.
669 (1927).
43. 36 N.Y.S.(2d) 313 (1942).
44. Id. at 317.
45. 46 N.Y.S.(2d) 871 (1944).
46. 195 Ga. 723, 25 S.E.(2d) 576 (1943).
47.. 195 Ga. 723, 732, 25 S.E.(2d) 576, 581.
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a foreign judgment, in the absence of the well settled exceptions,
should be held conclusive by the courts of Georgia.
In California, by statute,48 the courts are required "to give a
final judgment of a foreign country the same effect as a final
judgment rendered in this state."4 " This was pointed out in 164
East 72nd Street Corporation v. Ismay, 50 wherein plaintiff was
suing to enforce a valid and subsisting English judgment.
Minnesota, on the other hand, has apparently accepted the
doctrine of reciprocity. In Traders Trust Company v. Davidson'1
the plaintiff sought enforcement of a Manitoba judgment. "Effect
is given to foreign judgments as a matter of comity and recipro-
city," said the court, "and it has become the rule to give no other
or greater effect to the judgment of a foreign court than the
country or state whose court rendered it gives to a like judgment
of our courts. . . .And we may note in passing that in Manitoba
a foreign judgment does not conclude the defendant even as to
the merits. '52 The court, however, chose to ground the decision
on the lack of jurisdiction of the Manitoba tribunal over the de-
fendant in the original action.
In Louisiana the cases decided prior to the Hilton case made
very clear that, in the absence of fraud or lack of jurisdiction,
conclusive effect would be given to judgments rendered in foreign
countries. In Jones v. Jamison" the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
in speaking of the effect to be given a Jamaican judgment, felt
that the judgment "ought to be absolutely conclusive every-
where."5 4 Their reasoning was based upon Article 746 of the Code
of Practice which, before 1846, allowed a judgment creditor, in
addition to the ordinary remedies, to proceed by executory pro-
cess upon any judgment rendered in a sister state or a foreign
country which had the force of res judicata. "The statute of
1846," said the court, "does not seem to have lessened the conclu-
sive character of foreign judgments, but to have refused the exe-
cutory process only .... The ordinary remedy is still left the
creditor; and the judgment of a sister State or foreign country,
48. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937) § 1915. "A final judgment of any
other tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction, according to the
laws of such country, to pronounce the judgment, shall have the same effect
as in the country where rendered, and also the same effect as final judg-
ments rendered in this state."
49. 164 East 72nd Street Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App.(2d) 574, 576, 151
P.(2d) 29, 30 (1944).
50. 65 Cal. App.(2d) 574, 151 P.(2d) 29.
51. 146 Minn. 224, 178 N.W. 735 (1920).
52. 146 Minn. 224, 227, 178 N.W. 735, 736.
53. 15 La. Ann. 35 (1860).
54. Id. at 36.
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as a consequence, have no less force than before."55 Similarly, in
State ex rel. Plaisent v. Orleans Railroad Company,56 plaintiff
was seeking a writ of mandamus to compel a corporation to trans-
fer stock on its books. Plaintiff relied upon a French judgment
declaring him to be the owner of the stock. "It is not pretended
that the court was without jurisdiction, or that the forms of law
were not observed, or that the judgment is not final or executory;
but it is claimed that it is erroneous, inasmuch as part of the
shares actually belongs to Mrs. Cheron. We cannot review it. The
judgment concludes Mrs. Cheron and cannot be vicariously at-
tacked by the company for her benefit when she cannot do so
herself. Res adjudicata, pro veritate habetur."57 Since the deci-
sion in the Hilton case, the court has again been called upon to
give effect to a foreign judgment. The rule has remained un-
changed. With regard to the effect to be given a Nicaraguan judg-
ment, the court has said: "It is settled jurisprudence . . . that
'matters once determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, if
the judgment has become final, can never again be called into
question by the parties or their privies ... 5.8r However, lack of
reciprocity has never been urged in Louisiana. It is felt that if
and when the issue is presented, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
will reject the doctrine as New York has done and give effect
"rather upon the persuasiveness of the foreign judgment."
Since the decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,"9
what effect does Hilton v. Guyot have on the lower federal
courts? Clearly before the Erie Railroad Company case it was
settled that questions of conflict of laws or enforcement of judg-
ments of foreign countries, unless controlled by local statute,
were questions of "general law," in which the federal courts were
not bound to follow the decisions of the state courts. The doctrine
of the Erie Railroad Company case abolished the distinction be-
tween "general law" on the one hand and local or statutory law
on the other and made binding upon the federal courts in matters
of "substantive law," all state laws, statutory or otherwise, except
in matters affected by the Constitution and laws of the United
55. Ibid.
56. 38 La. Ann. 312 (1886).
57. Id. at 313.
58. Succession of Fitzgerald, 192 La. 726, 733, 189 So. 116, 117 (1939). Cf.
Truscon Steel Co. v. Biegler, 306 Ill. App. 180, 28 N.E. (2d) 623 (1940); Clubb
v. Clubb, 334 Ill. App. 599, 80 N.E.(2d) 94 (1948); Korlik v. Curry, 148 Mich.
214, 111 N.W. 761 (1907). But cf. Grey v. Independent Order of Foresters, 196
S.W. 779 (Mo. App. 1917).
59. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
1950]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
States. 60 Decisions of the state courts as to conflict of laws have
been held to be substantive law.61 But as to state rules on the
enforcement of foreign judgment, there arises the question of
whether they are substantive or procedural within the meaning
of the Erie rule.6 2 If procedural, then the federal courts are not
bound to follow the state court decisions. 63 Initially the lower
federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court of the United
States, must decide into which category the state rule falls 64 and
the denomination of the rule as substantive or procedural by the
state court is irrelevant to this determination. 5
The problem appears closely akin to that involving burden of
proof, and it has been held by the federal courts that burden of
proof is a substantive matter.6
The considerations involved in the burden of proof cases,
choice of law cases, and cases involving the enforcement of judg-
ments of foreign countries would appear to be the same. The
purpose of overruling Swift v. Tyson,67 and all the jurisprudence
thereunder, was to prevent the accident of diversity of citizen-
ship from creating a lack of conformity in .the outcome of a law-
suit, whether decided in federal or state court, within the borders
of a state. "For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal
court is 'in effect, only another court of the state.' "68 No matter
how predictable an answer may seem, however, the question re-
mains open as to whether the enforcement of judgments of foreign
countries will be categorized as substantive or procedural.
Assume it is held to be substantive law. If P, having recov-
ered a judgment in France, seeks to enforce this judgment in a
federal court in New York and D contends lack of reciprocity, is
60. King v. United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 68 S.Ct. 488, 92
L.Ed. 608 (1948).
61. Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85
L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S.Ct. 1023, 85 L.Ed.
1481 (1941).
62. See Gorrell and Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After (1948) 9 Ohio
St. L.J. 276; Comment (1944) 44 Col. L. Rev. 915.
63. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme
Court under authority of a statute of Congress June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064,
28 U.S.C. 2072.
64. See Tunks, Categorization and Federalism, "Substance" and "Proce-
dure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1941) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 271; Comment
(1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 1403, 1416.
65. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.(2d) 754 (C.C.A. 1st, 1940), cert. denied
310 U.S. 650, 60 S.Ct. 1099, 84 L.Ed. 1415 (1940).
66. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 60 S.Ct. 201, 84 L.Ed. 196
(1939).
67. 41 U.S. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842).




the judgment conclusive upon the merits? Apparently the federal
court would be duty bound to follow the decisions of the state
courts respecting the idea of reciprocity, and must of necessity
hold the judgment to be conclusive upon the merits.
In a state where reciprocity has been received with favor,
the decision, of course, would be exactly opposite. Here the fed-
eral court, for the very same reasons, would be duty bound to
apply the doctrine of reciprocity.
Some difficulty arises where a judgment obtained in France
is sought to be enforced in a federal court in a state wherein the
reciprocity idea has never been considered. For instance, in Lou-
isiana it is the law that in the absence of the well-settled excep-
tions, that is, fraud or lack of jurisdiction, a judgment obtained in
a foreign country is conclusive upon the merits. Since this is the
law of Louisiana, under the Erie Railroad Company doctrine it
must be applied as such. In the absence of circumstances showing
a probable reception of reciprocity, what reason would a federal
court sitting in Louisiana have to interject the reciprocal comity
doctrine? That would not be the law of Louisiana, but clearly
federal general common law, and under the Erie Railroad Com-
pany case, "There is no federal general common law. Congress
has no power to declare substantive rules of common law appli-
cable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,'
• . .And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts."69 Hence, the federal court would




In the field of torts, as in any other field of law, it is necessary
in order for the injured party to bring a successful suit that he
be given by some law a cause of action. The question immedi-
ately arises as to which law the injured party will look in deter-
mining whether he has a cause of action against the defendant.
The courts have had little difficulty when all the events giving
rise to the action occur in one jurisdiction,1 whether the forum
69. 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 118, 119, 114 A.L.R. 1487,
1493 (1938). See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed.
9 (1943).
Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, Shreveport Bar.
1. See 15 C.J.S. 897, note 63, for collection of cases. See also Hunter v.
Derby Foods, Inc., 110 F.(2d) 970, 133 A.L.R. 255 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940), and anno-
tions following case.
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